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SAS 34 Procedures vs. Forecast Reviews:
The Gap in GAAS
Robert S. Kay
Touche Ross & Co.
Overview of the Paper
This paper explores the guidance given to auditors in early 1981 in SAS 34,
"The Auditor's Considerations when a Question Arises About an Entity's
Continued Existence," in comparison with procedures contained in the
AICPA's 1980 Guide for a Review of a Financial Forecast ("forecast guide").
In the author's opinion, there is little differentiation in the satisfaction the
auditor/reviewer is to obtain under these two forms of guidance, and the result
may be that the auditor will be called upon for failure to have performed at the
level of the forecast guide. Neither document has been in existence long
enough for such problems to have matured, but based on the evolution of
accountants' liability, the author foresees significant challenges in court unless
the auditing profession promptly reconciles the two documents.
It is important to recognize that the forecast guide calls for a display of the
most probable future result, which could be considerably more difficult to
achieve than the prediction implied by SAS 34—that is, that a company will
have zero or better net cash inflow, without identifying any specific amount
thereof. To this extent, one would expect the forecast guide procedures to be
more penetrating. Accordingly, this paper knowingly makes a more aggressive
case than probably is applicable for audits today.
The views expressed in this paper are a priori, fortified by experience with
several practice cases where the auditor recognized the problem and aimed at
the forecast guide levels of attainment, believing this was the prudent approach
in the clients' circumstances. In this sense, the author offers thoughts on what
he perceives to be an emerging problem facing the auditing profession.
Experienced accountants can be expected to disagree on whether a problem is
emerging, and if so, how to solve it.
A Gathering Storm
In the current economic environment, businesses face an unprecedented
and sustained liquidity crisis; failures are common and increasing. Consider for
example the thrift industry, which in an unregulated environment (without
FSLIC or FDIC assistance) would be faced with cataclysmic disaster through
having lent long and borrowed short. Should the auditor be exceptionally alert
in these circumstances? How much responsibility will have to be borne for
these failures?
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The authoritative auditing literature is liberally sprinkled with exculpations
declaring that the auditor is not a fortune teller. For example, SAS 34,
paragraph 9, says:
The auditor's function, however, does not include predicting the
outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on the financial
statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the auditor
that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period
beyond the date of his opinion.
Experience shows that auditors should not take too much comfort in soothing
passages of this type. The litigable issue will not be identified as the future
orientation, but rather as the proper assessment of available facts (with
"available" meaning discoverable through the "right" inquiries and investigation).
Legal Framework
Legal precedent over the years has developed to a point that auditors can
expect to be called to task in the event a company fails. This is especially so for
publicly held companies, given the opportunity to assert misrepresentations in
the financial statements and the accompanying auditor's report under Section
11 of the 1933 Securities Act. This puts the burden of proof on the auditor as
not being a party to whatever is alleged to be wrong with the financial
statements (i.e., the auditor did not determine that the company was about to
fail); and the test for auditor non-culpability is stringent:
After making reasonable investigation (i.e., exercising "due diligence"), he had reasonable ground to believe, and did in fact believe,
that the statements in his audit opinion were true; in effect, the auditor
will be held liable unless he can prove that he exercised due care, i.e.,
was not negligent either in the performance of his audit or in the
expression of his audit opinion (which is indeed a rigorous standard
though not insurmountable).
1

When considering going concern situations, the focus is on the future, or
the post-balance-sheet period. If a company files a registration statement,
Section 11(a) of the 1933 Securities Act is unique in continuing the audit opinion
responsibility to the effective date of the registration statement, rather than
only to the date of the audit opinion. "It is possible that the information
available to the auditor at the audit opinion date might justify one audit opinion,
but that additional information available to the auditor at or near the effective
date might then require a different audit opinion." The professional literature
does not require a post-balance-sheet investigation to be as rigorous as the
audit examination, but how much should have been enough is always debatable
in the aftermath of a collapse.
Admittedly, companies in a noticeably precarious financial position and
therefore candidates for going concern qualification are not likely to be filing
1933 Act registration statements. But there is, as ever, an easy route that
plaintiffs may take strictly based on periodic filings under the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. Section 10(b) prohibits the making of any untrue statement of a
material fact or omission of a statement of material fact necessary in order to
2
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make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading. Rule 10b-5 deals with any offer or sale of
securities, and has been interpreted to apply to any action taken in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. Thus, the rule has been construed
broadly enough so that auditors' opinions on auditedfinancialstatements, and
unaudited financial statements with which auditors have become associated,
may be statements in connection with purchases and sales of the corporation's
securities. The auditor is clearly "in the soup" even though he is not in the
securities brokerage business.
The auditor is also not required to actively participate in or know about the
presentation of misleading statements. The profession's euphoria over the
Hochfelder decision, requiring the auditor to have scienter or "knowledge" to
be held responsible, has rapidly dissipated. Scienter has been transmogrified
into recklessness, a form of negligence, a prevalent definition of which is found
in McLean vs. Alexander :
4

Reckless conduct may be defined as . . . highly unreasonable [conduct],
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
This may sound safe—what good auditor does that?—but in terms of going
concern situations, one must at least wonder about whether some of today's
situations will be deemed after the fact to have been "so obvious that the actor
must have been aware of it."
One last bit of relevant law: a determination of failure to have made the
inquiry that might have revealed a deficiency is negligence; if it is sufficiently
extreme it could be recklessness.
It is tempting to assert that today, SEC enforcement is rapidly waning, and
that litigation for the most part is running much in the accountants' favor. That
would be, perhaps, foolhardy; the SEC retains all its powers and must be
counted on to reactivate enforcement if a serious failure of auditors is
perceived. Once the SEC "rings the gong," the litigants will swarm.
Auditors and Uncertainties
Uncertainties clearly existed in financial reporting long before auditors
came into being. Thus, the consideration of effects of uncertainties on clients'
financial statements has been an evolutionary process. An early exposition of
this subject is contained in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 32, "Qualifications and Disclaimers," issued in 1962 for purposes of clarifying reporting
standards called for under what was then Rule 2.03 of the AICPA's Code of
Professional Ethics. That ethical conclusion was intended to add further
specification to the fourth standard of reporting (which was subsequently added
to the nine original Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) indicating that "the
report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's
examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking."
The language of SAP 32 was carried forward into SAP 33, "Codification of
Statement on Auditing Procedures," and, in substance, remained relatively
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intact in the recodification in SAS 1 in 1972. However, the recodification
procedure and the litigation against auditors in the early 1970's revealed a need
for further attention to the auditor's forms of reporting including uncertainties.
The result was the issuance of SAS 2, "Reports on Audited Financial
Statements," in 1974. These are essentially the reporting formats we practice
under today.
SAS 34, "The Auditor's Considerations When a Question Arises About an
Entity's Continued Existence," does not alter the basic format in SAS 2; the
SAS 34 exemplary report showing a qualification ("subject to," as contrasted
with disclaimer) in a going concern situation is built on the preexisting SASs and
gives specification to what otherwise might be a stock "fill-in-the-blanks" form
of report.
Prior to SAS 34, auditing pronouncements seemed to heavily emphasize
thefinancialstatements—much as if they were disembodied from the company.
SAS 34 appears to aim much more directly at the company itself—will it make
it, or will it not? While SAS 34 necessarily hinges the auditor's concerns to the
only outlet he controls—his audit report—and thus to thefinancialstatements,
it is apparent by reading SAS 34 that the issue of how to report is simple in
comparison with what the auditor has to consider and do in relation to future
oriented information, almost all of which is not incorporated in the client's
accounting records. Only then can a conclusion be reached about including or
not including a going concern qualification (or disclaimer) in the auditor's
report.
SAS 34 vs. the Forecasting Guide
The basic premise of SAS 34 is that, any time up to the date of the report,
once the auditor becomes aware (through what is referred to as "contrary
information"), that the going concern assumption may be in question, regardless of the source of the information, the auditor had better investigate to determine whether (and how) the report needs to be amended to make reference
to the situation.
Let us assume that auditors today are especially conscious about and
inquire into a client's continued viability, rather than awaiting inspiration or
evidence to come marching in. Whether or not such preconditioning is true, the
focal issue is, once the auditor is concerned, what procedures should the
auditor follow in considering a client's continued viability. Further, recognizing
that prognostications could be wrong (i.e., some going concerns will become
non-going concerns), what will the courts decide about the reasonable level of
performance? Said differently, auditors make judgments and some judgments
are invariably wrong. The auditor needs to support judgment with the proper
defense, which could very well be something more penetrating than having
followed SAS 34. That "something" probably will be the AICPA's 1980 Guide
for Review of a Financial Forecast.
Some questions that might be asked about SAS 34 and the forecast guide
are:
• What "forecasting" procedures are implied by SAS 34?
• In a SAS 34 situation, can the auditor simply "throw in the towel"
and issue his "going concern" opinion after coursing through minimal
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procedures, or are there situations in which review must be conducted to the extent contemplated in a review of afinancialforecast?
• Under what circumstances would a prudent auditor expand SAS 34
procedures to incorporate some or all of the procedures for review of
a financial forecast?
• How large is the gap between what the auditor already knows and
does in an SAS 34 engagement and the knowledge and procedures
called for in the forecast guide?
A comparison of the relevant forecast guide requirements with SAS 34
considerations follows, stated in terms of the forecast guide procedures, with
reference to the substance of coverage in SAS 34. Particular reference should
be made to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34, reproduced in Appendix A.
Forecast Guide

SAS 34

Definitions
• A forecast is the "most probable" No definitions of forecast or projestimate.
ection; mentions both.
• A projection may or may not be
representative of the "most probable" estimate.
Management's Responsibilities
• The forecast and underlying as- • This would be a given in any ensumptions are the responsibility of
vironment, whether in an audit exmanagement, regardless of the acamination or review of a forecast.
countant's participation.
• The accountant may assist in the • Nothing revelationary. Just as in an
formulation of assumptions, but
audit, the auditor can assist the
management must evaluate them
company and management in seand make decisions as to their realecting accounting policies, but
sonableness.
management makes the decision.
The Accountant's Review
• In general, the forecast reviewer •
should:
-have adequate technical training
and expertise
-maintain an independence of mental attitude
-exercise due professional care
-adequately plan and supervise the
engagement
-understand the forecasting process
-obtain adequate support for the
conclusions reached.
• The scope of the accountant's review is governed by the following:
-knowledge of the business, focusing
on its operating characteristics,
the nature and condition of sales
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The Auditor's Considerations
Except for the possibility that the
level of technical expertise needed
in a forecast engagement is greater,
the remainder of these qualities are
GAAS-oriented and would be implicit in a SAS 34 engagement.

-This is required by SAS 1, Planning and Supervision (AU 311).

markets, unique industry charac- There is nothing here that the auditor
teristics and patterns of past per- shouldn't already know to a certain
degree.
formance.
-management's forecasting experi- -No specific requirement, but it is
common sense. Would an auditor
ence, including review of past forelook at and believe a cash forecast
casts and related actual results.
without some level of inquiry
about management's forecasting
experience.
-Again, this would seem to be in
-forecast period, including considthe area of logical inquiry by the
eration of the forecast period's
auditor.
length and extent of inclusion of
historical results.
-forecasting process, the knowledge -This is not required in SAS 34; it
requires more than inquiry by the
of which is based on inquiry, obauditor.
servations and review of documentation.
• Procedures to evaluate assumptions:
-In view of the "knowledge bank''
-based on knowledge of the busipossessed by the auditor, these
ness, identify key factors that infactors should probably already be
fluence the company's financial
known, even in a non-SAS 34 enresults. This considers their relegagement, though undoubtedly in
vance, completeness, sensitivity
a less formalized way than conin relation to financial results, and
templated in the forecasting guide.
pervasiveness.
-This
is not REQUIRED by SAS 34
-evaluate whether the assumptions
and would require some digging by
are suitably supported.
the auditor.
-Same under GAAS. Rule 201 of
-no conclusion can be drawn by the
accountant as to whether the forethe AICPA Code of Professional
cast is the "most probable" outEthics prohibits vouching for the
come. Management's intentions
achievability of a forecast.
and inherent uncertainties of forecasts necessarily place this conclusion on management's plate.
-SAS 34 emphasis is identical.
-the assumptions to be focused
upon are those that are material,
especially sensitive to variations,
deviate from historical trends, or
are uncertain.
-SAS 34 requires review and com-the adequacy of support for asparison of the prospective inforsumptions is based on:
mation with past prospective
(1) existence of sufficient pertiinformation, historicalfinancialinnent sources.
formation, and the accuracy of
(2) whether assumptions are conpast prospective information. Fursistent with their sources.
ther, omissions of relevant infor(3) whether historical or other fimation and assumptions should be
nancial information and data
noted. This would encompass at
are reliable.
least points (3) and (4) at left.
(4) whether the historical financial
Further, points (5), (6) and (7)
or other data are comparable
would seem a logical extension of
or whether differences were
any review of a forecast.
factored in.
168

(5) whether the assumptions are
consistent with each other.
(6) whether the logical argument
or theory, considered with the
assumptions, is reasonable.
(7) whether alternate approaches
support the reasonableness of
the assumptions.
Management Representations
• Should be in writing and acknowl- • SAS 34 does not mention written
edge management's responsibility
representations. However, such
for both the forecast and underlying
representations would seem called
assumptions
for anyway in an audit engagement
representations letter, at least to
back up management's disclosures
within the financial statements
about the effect of uncertainties on
the company's future.
In a SAS 34 situation, the auditor must address all of the factors considered
in that statement prior to drawing a conclusion about an entity's continued
existence. This implies that the auditor's procedures for review of forecasts,
projections, etc. prepared in conjunction with an audit offinancialstatements
should be thorough and complete.
As the table above suggests, the detailed procedures called for in the
forecast guide can be viewed as simply a logical and necessary articulation of
the generalized procedures contained in SAS 34. In most cases, it would seem
imprudent of the auditor to ignore the guide's suggested approach and
procedures—they are formalized in an AICPA document written for accountants, not management consultants, and arguably should serve as the basis for
the general procedures described in paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34.
The only procedures stated in the forecast guide that are not direct and
logical articulations of the SAS 34 approach are (a) knowledge of the forecasting
process, and (b) evaluation as to whether the forecast assumptions are suitably
supported. Something to keep in mind—the forecast guide implies the auditor
should possess a certain level of knowledge about the entity and about
forecasting. With the possible exception of a technical aptitude for forecast
reviews based on experience, the knowledge required of an auditor in a
forecasting engagement is not different from the knowledge required by GAAS
in a SAS 34 engagement (or, for that matter, any audit).
5

Analysis of Differences
The dimensions of the difference between SAS 34 and the forecast guide
can be classified into four areas:
1. Nature of procedures
2. Extent of procedures (degree and quality of evidence obtained)
3. Severity of opinion (or lack thereof)
4. Extent of client disclosures.
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Overall, the nature of procedures in either document is not that different,
but SAS 34 is sufficiently non-imperative (i.e., "consider this; consider that")
to permit a sincere case to be made by an auditor that reasonable procedural
compliance with SAS 34 consists simply of a grasp of the situation and oral
management representations.
Nature of Procedures. Differences between SAS 34 coverage and the
nature of forecast review guide procedures lie in, (i) knowledge of the client's
forecasting system, and (ii) the extent of articulation of the assumptions.
The audit client may not even have thought about having a forecasting or
projection system, having no intention of ever publishing any such prospective
data. Given that the auditor likewise is not planning on publicly reporting on the
client's forecast, the extent (or lack) of sophistication of the forecasting
"system" is probably secondary. What has to be of most concern to the
auditor is the thoroughness, logic and credibility of the assumptions, and the
correctness of calculations. While these are more difficult to deal with absent a
formal system, they are nevertheless susceptible of analysis and understanding. Hopefully, the courts will not hold an auditor (or the company) deficient for
the company's failure to have developed a formal forecasting system that
generates data designed to show that the company will or will not go out of
business. Being on the brink of disaster does not usually warrant the
expenditure to establish and run a forecasting system. Thus, we will leave this
issue, simply recognizing that without a system, the numbers and assumptions
become more subjective.
To be able to better understand the client's conclusion, a good deal more
articulation of assumptions might be needed. Though management may intuit
an assumption, the numerous subassumptions must be communicated to an
auditor, explicitly or implicitly, to permit focusing on their reasonableness and
the type of evidence that may be available.
Extent of Procedures. SAS 34 identifies its procedures as "considerations.''
Most are listed in terms of "may" rather than "should." The exception lies in
paragraph 9, requiring discussion with management about available forecasts,
projections, budgets or other prospective data, particularly data relating to
future cash flows. However, this paragraph does not require management to
actually produce this information; the only standard is that it must be
information that can reasonably be developed and that whatever is proffered is
relevant. "Reasonable" will remain undefined except when a situation is
litigated to a conclusion.
Paragraph 9 addresses the auditor thus: "The auditor should consider the
support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective data and should
give particular attention to assumptions that are material to the relevant
forecasts or projections, [are] especially uncertain or sensitive to variations,
[and that deviate] from historical trends." This sounds imperative, but it is
immediately diluted by directing the auditor to base his considerations on:
a. Reading,
b. Knowledge of the entity, its business and its management, and
c. Analytical comparison of past, present and future data.
Even after doing these minimal procedures, the only admonition is this: "If
the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors, the effects of which are not
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reflected in such prospective data, he should also take those factors into
account."
The forecast guide is much more specific about what the accountant must
do. He must consider the following matters (page 9):
1. Whether sufficient pertinent sources of information about the assumptions have been considered. Examples of external sources the
accountant might consider are government publications, industry
publications, economic forecasts, existing or proposed legislation,
and reports of changing technology. Examples of internal sources are
budgets, labor agreements, patents, royalty agreements, engineering studies, historicalfinancialstatements and records, sales backlog
records, debt agreements, and board of directors actions involving
entity plans.
2. Whether the assumptions are consistent with the sources from
which they are derived.
3. Whether the assumptions are consistent with each other.
The remaining three considerations (not listed above) are equivalent to those in
SAS 34.
After this list of considerations in the forecast guide, there are two
particularly incisive paragraphs about items probably infrequently considered in
performing SAS 34 procedures. These state (page 10):
Support for assumptions may include market surveys, engineering
studies, general economic indicators, industry statistics, trends and
patterns developed from an entity's operating history, and internal data
and analyses, accompanied by their supporting logical argument or
theory. The accountant may also obtain support during the evaluation of
the forecasting process. Support for a forecast can range from information based on informed opinion (such as economists' estimates of the
inflation rate) to data that can be tested in traditional ways (such as
completed transactions).
In addition to evaluating management's assumptions and their sources
of information, the accountant should consider using alternative approaches to the development of assumptions in evaluating the forecasted amounts. For example, to test management's forecast of
aggregate sales developed from individual salesmen's estimates, the
accountant may employ a historical trend estimate.
The forecast guide also contains detailed illustrative procedures, many of
which would be most apropos in a going concern situation.
It is almost obvious that SAS 34 studiously avoided a requirement that
evidence be obtained. There are striking similarities between the going
concern discussion in Auditing Research Monograph 1 and the content of SAS
34, but ARM 1 ". . . deals almost entirely with the going-concern concept as it
affected the evidence-gathering aspects of the examination." A typical
passage about evidence reads:
6

Evidence thatfinancingor operating problems have been mitigated may
remove the immediate threat to the continued existence of a company.
Financing problems may be mitigated by a waiver or default or an
anticipated influx of funds. If there is sufficient competent evidential
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matter that the terms of indebtedness will be adjusted or if an
arrangement actually deferring payment is obtained, the peril to the
continued existence of the company may be removed. An anticipated
influx of funds—if supported by evidential matter—may also remove the
peril of liquidation. The influx may be from a variety of sources, such as
demonstrated ability to continue borrowing, the obligation or desire of a
related entity not to allow liquidation, or viable alternatives open to
management infinancingoperations.
Evidence indicating successful future operations may be in the form of
reliable company plans or budgets, or operational or management
changes essential to a "turn-around" of operations. To a large extent
the auditor's ability to evaluate operating problems will depend on the
extent of his past experience with the company's operations. The
auditor's ability to determine the reasonableness of management's
estimates will be influenced both by the company's experience and his
own evaluation of management's objectivity and knowledgeability concerning the subject of estimation.
7

Accountant's Forecast Report Vs. Auditor's Report. It is logical that the
major difference between SAS 34 procedures and forecast guide procedures
lies in the extent of evidentiary support obtained, because the form of forecast
report does not allow for degrees of related uncertainty to be reflected in the
wording. The forecast guide states (page 25):
Limitations on the scope of the review, whether imposed by the client
or by other circumstances, may require the accountant to state in his
report that he cannot evaluate the presentation of the forecast or assess
whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's
forecast.
Further, a scope limitation includes one that is imposed "by circumstances,
such as the accountant's inability to evaluate significant assumption(s) because
they are not suitably supported." What this effectively amounts to is a
disclaimer of opinion on the forecast—no "subject to" opinions.
When this condition occurs, the accountant is required to state:
Since, as described in the preceding paragraph, we are unable to
evaluate management's assumption regarding . . . and other assumptions that depend thereon, we express no conclusion with respect to
the presentation of the accompanyingfinancialforecast.
If this is where the auditor would end up after applying the forecast guide
procedures in an audit going concern situation, should he say so, in addition to
expressing a qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion?
It could be asserted (perhaps it was even intended) that the auditor's SAS
34 approach in reporting on the examination offinancialstatements affords an
appropriate opportunity to do less—because the auditor of historical financial
statements seems to have more options about how much uncertainty he should
accept before expressing other than an unqualified opinion.
SAS 34 seems to excuse the auditor from doing a great deal of work before
considering the effects of going concern conditions on his report. Paragraph 11
states: "After making any substantive tests that the auditor considers
necessary and practicable to assess such information, factors, and plans" the
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auditor could reach a conclusion that the audit report need not be modified;
then again, modification might not be necessary. Further, paragraph 11 alludes
to what the auditor might do upon concluding that the company is not a going
concern: "Identifying the point at which uncertainties about recoverability,
classifications, and amounts require the auditor to modify his report is a
complex professional judgment." An example follows in paragraph 12 of an
opinion qualified for going-concern reasons, perhaps hinting at that course of
action.
SAS 34 is silent on whether a disclaimer of opinion might be appropriate
because of the magnitude of uncertainties, but defers, by reference to SAS 2
(including the particular paragraph that [by footnote] does not prohibit the
auditor from expressing a disclaimer). SAS 2 indicates:
The committee believes that the explanation of the uncertainties and
the qualification of the auditor's opinion contemplated by this section
should serve adequately to inform the users of financial statements.
Nothing in this section, however, is intended to preclude an auditor
from declining to express an opinion in cases involving uncertainties. If
he disclaims an opinion, the uncertainties and their possible effects on
the financial statements should be disclosed in an appropriate manner,
and the auditor's report should give all the substantive reasons for his
disclaimer of opinion. (AU 509.25, footnote 8.)
Thus, there is absolutely nothing in the professional literature demanding a
disclaimer of opinion as a signal for increasing the user's perception of the
severity of the situation.
Assume that following SAS 34 procedures, the auditor does not gather a
great deal of independent evidence about the veracity of the client's assumptions used in a projection that indicates a workout of the going concern
situation. Also assume that the auditor issues a "subject to going concern"
opinion as exemplified in SAS 34. After all, SAS 34 does not contain mandates.
Will it be sustainable by the auditor, should the company shortly thereafter
enter bankruptcy, that all professional standards applicable to the audit were
fully adhered to? Would this be true if inquiry outside the company, such as
with suppliers, customers, trade associations, etc., or analysis of competitors'
strengths, could have indicated rather clearly that the company was going to be
unable to achieve the assumptions indicated in its projections? Would, in such a
circumstance, it be a better defense to have expressed a disclaimer of opinion?
A disclaimer may not serve to further insulate the accountant if procedures
were, under the circumstances, less than might have been expected (i.e., "the
Standard of practice in the community"). Said differently, the auditor could
argue the impossibility of objectively auditing the future (so why try too hard?);
and that therefore there was justification for expressing such inability through a
stronger form of negative opinion—i.e., a disclaimer.
If indeed the major assumptions are opaque—for example, a certain level of
interest rate must be achieved on the company's borrowings orfinancingneeds
in the future, or the company's new product needs to be a success in order for
the company to survive, the auditor is well advised to spell out these problems
in his report, regardless of which kind of opinion or non-opinion is expressed. It
is not as though the courts would hold the auditor responsible for having
attested to such items if there was a failure to express the inability to do so, but
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it could be held that readers were not sufficiently informed of the sensitivity of
the assumptions to have been able to reason along with the auditor towards the
conclusion reached. In the end, failure to have adequately communicated to
users can be as fatal as the unlikely determination that the auditor should have
used a crystal ball.
Extent of Disclosure
Naturally, the client should make all the necessary disclosures attendant to
its circumstances. In those situations where neither the company nor the
auditor express any concern about ability to continue to operate, and the
company shortly thereafter fails, both are undoubtedly in jeopardy. What if,
however, the company expresses (in its Management Discussion and Analysis
portion of the annual report) that it foresees serious problems in the future, and
while not being fatalistic about it in detail, puts in enough clues about dangers to
continuation of the business? If under those circumstances the auditor
addresses the situation via SAS 34 and concludes that a going concern
qualification is not necessary, the auditor could be targeted in the event of
business failure. It would seem that the auditor's opinion should be no better
than the company's representations wherever made, even if it takes some
effort to sort out exactly what the company is saying.
Sometimes the auditor in reviewing the company's situation may decide it
is in sufficient danger to merit a going concern qualification, but the company
does not agree, and refuses to paint the picture nearly so black as does the
auditor's report. In the event of subsequent failure, presumably the company
would then be in greater jeopardy than the auditor.
Forecasting has evolved a great deal in the past 10 years, commencing with
the SEC's removal of its fiat against forward-looking information. Despite SEC
allurements (e.g., safe harbor provisions) to companies to publish forecasts or
prospectivefinancialinformation, very few companies have done so. The SEC
recently came at it in other ways, by encouraging companies to put prospective
data in the MD&A section, as well as by permitting prospective information in
pro forma statements.
A question worth asking is whether companies should regularly begin
publishing, or at least preparing, forecasts in a uniform manner, making it
possible for the auditor to apply a consistent set of procedures. Given the
current economic malaise, most corporate managers must be thinking as far
forward as possible, even if on scraps of paper. It would be far better that these
be formalized.
Conclusion
Under today's conditions, is it reasonable for an auditor, when considering
a client's going concern status, to do less than the "maximum" for which the
profession has provided guidance? I believe there is a significant chance the
auditor will be held responsible for not doing this, and it is time for the
profession to close the gap.
There are numerous faltering companies today, whose entire asset/liability
structure may be inconsequential in view of the risks involved in noncontinuation as a going concern in the future. It seems the auditor is in a
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precarious position if the forecast guide procedures are not performed—
complete with market research, use of outside economists, industry data, etc.
Admittedly, an auditor would not be in a position to report on the forecast
because the reporting requirements thereunder allow only positive opinions or
no opinions. But perhaps the auditor should be permitted to report, using a
qualified forecast opinion, when in an audit framework. Such an approach might
even qualify for SEC safe-harbor treatment—far preferable to the expertised
status of an accountant's report containing merely a going-concern qualification. Likewise, forecasts need not be updated if there is no stated undertaking
to do so. Perhaps this feature could somehow blunt the impact of the auditor's
responsibility for subsequent events.
The auditing profession indeed faces a gap in GAAS. At a minimum, a
pronouncement is needed explaining the difference between SAS 34 and the
forecast guide; the situation is not clear to auditors as it now stands.
8

Footnotes
1. This annotated excerpt from Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act is taken from Cormley, R.
James, "Auditing and the Law," Chapter 46 in Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, edited by
John C. Burton, Russell E . Palmer and Robert S. Kay. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1981,
p. 46-26. Several other thoughts in this brief overview of legal considerations also come from this
source.
2. Ibid., p. 46-29.
3. ASR 115 excludes companies that have an imminent threat of failure from offering securities
under the 1933 Act. Yet, firms not reported to be in immediate danger can (and do) register for
"shelf" purposes even though they might not be strong enough to have a public offering for cash.
4. 599 F.2d 1190, 1196-1197 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. For example, SAS 22, Planning and Supervision, states that:
The auditor should obtain a level of knowledge of an entity's business that will enable him
to conduct his examination in accordance with GAAS. That level should enable him to
understand events, transactions and practices that may significantly affect the financial
statements. Knowledge of an entity's business helps the auditor in evaluating the
reasonableness of estimates and management representations. In addition, the auditor
should have knowledge of the nature of the entity's business, organization and operating
characteristics and matters affecting the entity's industry. Sources of this knowledge
encompass data internal and external to the entity (AU 311.06-.08). [Emphasis added.]
6. Carmichael, D. R. Chapter 6, "Pervasive Uncertainties—Going Concern Problems," in The
Auditor's Reporting Obligation, Auditing Research Monograph 1. New York: AICPA, p. 109.
7. Ibid., p. 99.
8. Kent St. Pierre and James Anderson, in "An Analysis of Audit Failures Based on
Documented Legal Cases," Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Spring 1982, state (p.
243):
The [Cohen] Commission's staff concluded that audit failures were not a result of
deficiencies in auditing standards. Fifteen percent of the errors classified in this study
pertained to the interpretation of auditing standards. Although the interpretation of
accounting principles and the implementation of auditing procedures accounted for a
larger percentage of errors, the 15 percent figure is significant. The staff stated that
failures in this area were most frequently traceable to departures by auditors from the
standards.
The key issue seems to be whether the departure was intentional or whether the auditor
misinterpreted what the study group felt was a clear set of standards. The staff's
conclusion cannot be refuted based upon the analysis conducted here, but there is enough
available evidence to question the statement that no deficiencies exist in the standards. If
the standards are vague and open to misinterpretation, it is difficult to accept the
argument that the standards are adequate and raise the level of auditor performance. The
results of this study indicate that interpretation errors are common, even for auditors
familiar with the general standards.
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Appendix
SAS 34 Excerpt
Consideration of Contrary Information and Mitigating Factors
7. The auditor's initial consideration of contrary information focuses on the
underlying conditions that resulted in the contrary information (for example,
whether the conditions are indicative of a rapid or a gradual deterioration,
whether they are temporary or recurring, whether they are susceptible of
corrective actions solely within the entity, and whether they are applicable to
identifiable elements or segments of the entity or are pervasive). The auditor's
initial consideration of mitigating factors is based primarily on (a) knowledge of
matters that relate to the nature of the entity's business and its operating
characteristics and of matters affecting the industry in which it operates,
including an awareness of the specific effects and general influence of
international, national, and local economic conditions, (b) discussions with
principal officers having responsibility for administration, finance, operations,
and accounting activities, and (c) understanding of possible legal implications, if
any, based on discussions with appropriate legal counsel when that is deemed
necessary.
Consideration of Management Plans
8. Additional considerations often are necessary; they generally focus on
management plans that are responsive to the observed conditions that resulted
in the contrary information. The relevance of such plans to an auditor generally
decreases as the time period for planned actions and anticipated events
increases, although longer time periods may be more meaningful in industries
with a lengthy operating cycle. Particular emphasis ordinarily is placed on plans
that might have a significant effect on the entity's solvency within a period of
one year following the date of thefinancialstatements on which the auditor is
currently reporting. The auditor's considerations relating to such management
plans may include the following.
a. Plans to liquidate assets:
• Apparent marketability of the assets that management plans to sell.
• Restrictions on the disposal of assets, such as covenants limiting such
transactions in loan or similar agreements or encumbrances against
assets.
• Possible direct and indirect effects of the disposal of assets.
b. Plans to borrow money or restructure debt:
• Availability of debt financing, including existing or committed credit
arrangements, such as lines of credit and arrangements for factoring
receivables or sale-leaseback of assets.
• Existing or committed arrangements to restructure or subordinate
debt or to guarantee loans to the entity.
• Possible effects on management's borrowing plans of existing restrictions on additional borrowing and the sufficiency of available
collateral.
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c. Plans to reduce or delay expenditures:
• Apparent feasibility of plans to reduce overhead and administrative
expenditures, to postpone maintenance or research and development
projects, or to lease rather than purchase assets.
• Possible direct and indirect effects of reduced or delayed expenditures.
d. Plans to increase ownership equity:
• Apparent feasibility of plans to increase ownership equity, including
existing or committed arrangements to raise additional capital.
• Existing or committed arrangements to reduce current dividend
requirements or to accelerate cash distributions from affiliates or
other investees.
9. The auditor also should discuss with management any forecasts,
projections, budgets, or other prospective data, particularly data relating to
cash flows, that are available or that can reasonably be developed and that are
relevant in relation to the plans discussed in paragraph 8. The auditor should
consider the support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective
data and should give particular attention to assumptions that are
• Material to the relevant forecasts or projections.
• Especially uncertain or sensitive to variations.
• In deviation from historical trends.
The auditor's considerations should be based on (a) reading of the prospective
data and the underlying assumptions, (b) knowledge of the entity, its business,
and its management, and (c) comparison of prospective data in prior periods
with historical results and of prospective data for the current forecast period
with results achieved to date. If the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors
the effects of which are not reflected in such prospective data, he should also
take those factors into account. The auditor's function, however, does not
include predicting the outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on
the financial statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the
auditor that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period
beyond the date of his opinion.
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